I don't think this is an issue of "absolutism." This is an issue of understanding how Stefan's view works. I don't care about its answers in lifeboat situations. That doesn't matter. The reason lifeboat situations are worth examining is that they help us understand how moral systems come up with answers in situations where there are conflicts between important values. The answer itself, again, is peripheral. The interesting thing is to see how Stefan arrives at an answer.
On page 55 of his book on Universally Preferable Behavior, Stefan writes, "This is not to say that breaking the window to save your life is not wrong. It is, but it is a wrong that almost all of us would choose to commit rather than die. If I were on the verge of starving to death, I would steal an apple. This does not mean that it is right for me to steal the apple - it just means that I would do it - and must justly accept the consequences of my theft."
In light of that statement, the position Stefan takes in his article seems like a change in direction. Hence my first question. In addition to clarifying what Stefan's position is on this particular point, his answer will also be important for my understanding of his ethical system as a whole. An ethical system which acknowledges that it would be acceptable to do what's wrong seems very different from an ethical system which defines wrong as that which is unacceptable to do. I'm hoping to understand how the concept of "wrongness" fits into Stefan's view.
The reason I asked the second question is that Stefan's answer will reveal another interesting feature of his conception of rights. Stefan suggests that the window-smasher would be justified in kicking in the window because the victim would likely offer consent. But he also says that this assumption could be incorrect. The purpose in asking if the window-smasher would be justified in smashing the window if he knew that consent would be refused is to establish what qualifies as an acceptable basis for infringing on rights. Is it okay to smash the window because of what will happen to the victim, so that in an important sense, the victim would not be justified in insisting that her rights be upheld? Or is it only okay to smash the window because of the assumption of consent, so that it wouldn't be okay in the absence of that assumption? This is important in determining whether Stefan believes that the final say in whether a rights infringement is justified should be held by the holder of the right, or whether one can sometimes legitimately infringe on rights against the will of the holder of the rights.
So again, I really couldn't care less about the answer to the lifeboat example. It really doesn't matter. What's interesting is why Stefan answers the way he does. Hopefully that makes some sense.